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Douglass G. Boshkoff* *
On July 8, 1965 an automobile owned and operated by Adolfo Perez col-
lided with one owned by Leonard Pinkerton and operated by his daughter. This
accident began a series of events which concluded six years later with Justice
White's opinion in Perez v. Campbell,' one of the most interesting and signifi,
cant bankruptcy decisions in the last fifty years.
Fifteen months after the accident the Pinkertons brought suit against Adolfo
Perez. Perez or his attorney must have thought that bankruptcy2 would shelter
him from the consequences of his negligence, because a confession of judgment
in the Pinkerton suit and a voluntary bankruptcy for Perez followed in due
course. Initially, this strategy did not work. Arizona law authorized suspen-
sion of Adolfo's driver's license and vehicle registration for failure to satisfy the
Pinkerton judgment,3 notwithstanding receipt of a bankruptcy discharge. Ulti-
mately, Adolfo prevailed when the Supreme Court decided that the Supremacy
Clause invalidated the suspension sanction authorized by Arizona law.4
Perez is an intriguing decision. The result represented a complete about-
face by a court which twice within the preceding thirty years had upheld similar
provisions in other state laws. 5 Justice White was not content merely to dis-
tinguish the prior decisions. They were repudiated:
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine of
Kessler and Reitz that state law may frustrate the operation
of federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law
had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration....
Thus, we conclude that Kessler and Reitz can have no
authoritative effect to the extent that they are inconsistent
*Copyright 1992 by Douglass G. Boshkoff. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Daniel
Keating, Bruce Markell, William Popkin, Lauren Robel, and Gene Shreve, and the research assistance of
Sherry L. Young, class of 1993.
"Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).
1402 U.S. 637 (1971).
2Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 544, ch. 541 §§ 17(a) and 63(a)(7) (repealed 1979).
3Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1162 (1989).
4The offending language was not deleted by the Arizona legislature until 1990. H.B. 2039 An Act Relating
to Transportation etc. (1990) (codified as amended at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1163 (1991)).
$Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
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with the controlling principle that state legislation which frus-
trates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid
by the Supremacy Clause. Section 28-1163(B) thus may not
stand. 6
More importantly, Perez broke new ground by protecting the debtor from
harmful activity by non-creditors. The text of the thenexisting bankruptcy
statute7 only placed limits on direct collection activity. Perez articulates a much
more expansive view of debtor protection. Even those not directly involved
in the bankruptcy must take a forgiving view of the debtor's financial failure.
Otherwise, complete rehabilitation will not be possible. This aspect of debtor
protection is unique to American bankruptcy law. No other nation shows any
concern for shielding debtors from the collateral consequences of financial mis-
fortune.8
There were only a few opportunities for elaboration and possible refinement
of the Perez principle by judicial decision before codification occurred with enact-
ment of Bankruptcy Code § 525.9 Now, more than a decade after the effective
date of this legislation, there is a substantial body of case law interpreting and
applying its provisions. Most of the litigation challenges activity which has
an adverse effect on (1) the debtor's employment status,0 (2) the debtor's right
6Perez, 402 U.S. at 651-52.
7Pub. L. 91-467,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) added § 14(f) which provided that "[a]n order of discharge
shall-(b) enjoin all creditors whose debts are discharged from thereafter instituting or continuing any action
or employing any process to collect such debts as personal liabilities of the bankrupt" Most of the prePerez
litigation concerning the effect of the discharge focused on revocation of licenses. See 1 COLLuI ON Bmwrc
12.6215.2] n.53 (14th ed. 1976); 1A Id. 17.27 n.3 (14th ed. 1978). In re Hicks, 133 F. 739 (W.D.N.Y.
1905) is an unusual decision which anticipates the Perez result by more than half a century and invalidates
a discriminatory discharge from employment.
8The discharge of a debtor through legal proceedings, as contrasted with the discharge of obligation
through consent via a composition with creditors, is an Anglo-American invention. 1 JAN Hatmiu DAL-
HUISEN, INnTBSNATIoNAL INsOLvENcY AND BANUPTCY § 2.06[3] (1986). The law of England and Wales, how-
ever, even after recent pro-debtor changes, still provides far less debtor protection than American law. See
IAN F. FLEzCHER, 'Ik- LAw OF INSOLVENCY 295-300 (1990). British law contains no analogue to § 525.
911 U.S.C.A. § 525 (West 1979). The full text of § 525 is reproduced infra at note 20.
ieComeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1990); Laracuente v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1989); Mangan v. Cullen, 870 F.2d 1396 (8th Cir. 1989); Wilson
v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 777 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1985); Sweeney v. Ameritrust Co. (In re Sweeney),
113 B.R. 406 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Vaughter, 109 B.R. 229 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989); In re Callender,
99 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Tinker v. Sturgeon State Bank (In re Tinker), 99 B.R. 957 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1989); Anderson v. Weinberger (In re Anderson), 84 B.R. 426 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); McNeely
v. Hutchinson Fin. Corp. (In re McNeely), 82 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987); In re Hopkins, 81 B.R. 491
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987); Stockhouse v. Hines Motor Supply, 75 B.R. 83 (D. Wyo. 1987); Madison Madi-
son Intl v. Matra, S.A. (In re Madison Madison Int'l), 77 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987); Bell v. Sanford-
Corbitt-Bruker, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,114 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 1987); In re Hopkins, 66 B.R. 828
(Bankr. WD. Ark. 1986); Hicks v. First Natl Bank (In re Hicks), 65 B.R. 980 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986);
Applegate v. March (In re Applegate), 64 B.R. 448 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); Detz v. Hoover, 539 F. Supp.
532 (E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Latchaw, 24 B.R. 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Barbee v. First Virginia Bank-
Colonial (In re Barbee), 14 B.R. 773 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).
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to operate a motor vehicle," (3) the debtor's access to credit, 2 (4) the debtor's
ability to engage in a particular trade or businesss or (5) the debtor's ability
to obtain essential goods and services. Notwithstanding the existence of more
than 100 judicial decisions citing § 525, the full extent of protection against
"Norton v. Tennessee Dep't of Safety (In re Norton), 867 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989); Duffey v. Dollison,
734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984); Colon v. Hart (In re Collon), 102 B.R. 421 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Bill,
90 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988); Christensen v. New Jersey Div. of Motor Vehicles (In re Christensen)
95 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1988); Smith v. Pennsylvania Depft of Transp., 66 B.R. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
In re Adler, 47 B.R. 554 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); Holder v. Wisconsin Depft of Transp. (In re Holder), 40
B.R. 847 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984); In re'aylor, 27 B.R. 83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Hinders v. Miami Valley
Regional Transit Auth. (In re Hinders), 22 B.R. 810 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Shamblin v. Ohio (In re Sham,
blin), 18 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Cerny, 17 B.R. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Layfield
v. Department of Public Safety (In re Layfleld), 12 B.R. 846 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981); Briner v. Chames
(In re Briner), 10 B.R. 850 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); In re Patterson, 10 B.R. 860 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); Henry
v. Heyison, 4 B.R. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
X2Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co., 876 F.2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1989); Goldrichv. New York State Higher
Educ. Serv. Corp. (In re Goldrich), 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985); Lee v. Yeutter, 106 B.R. 588 (D. Minn. 1989),
affr, 917 .2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1990); Saunders v. Reeher (In re Saunders), 105 B.R. 781 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1989); Elter v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Elter), 95 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989); Elsinore
Shore Ass'n v. New Jersey Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control (In re Elsinore Shore Ass'n), 66 B.R. 708
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); Kotter v. United States Dep't of Agric. (In re Kotter), 58 B.R. 118 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1986); Helms v. Curtis (In re Helms), 46 B.R. 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985); In re Richardson, 27 B.R. 560
(E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Haffner, 25 B.R. 882 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982); Rose v. Connecticut Hous. Fin. Auth.
(In re Rose), 23 B.R. 662 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).
131n re Massenzio, 121 B.R. 688 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990) (insurance agent); In re Neberger, 120 B.R.
21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (liquor license), affid, 934 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir. 1991); Will Rogers Jockey & Polo
Club v. Oklahoma Horse Racing Comm'n (In re Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc.), 111 B.R. 948 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1990) (racetrack owner); Christmas v. Maryland Racing Comm'n (In re Christmas), 102 B.R.
447 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (horse trainer); Granger v. Harris (In re Harris), 85 B.R. 858 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1988) (educational institution); Nasson College v. New England Ass'n of Schools & Colleges, Inc. (In re
Nasson College), 80 B.R. 600 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988); In re The Bible Speaks, 69 B.R. 368 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987) (educational institution); Elsinore Shore Ass'n v. Casino Gambling Control Comm'n (In re Elsinore
Shore Ass'n), 66 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986) (gambling casino); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metro
Transp. Co. (In re Metro Trsnsp. Co.), 64 B.R. 968 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (taxicab operator); In re Rath
Packing Co., 35 B.R. 615 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (meat packer); Green v. Yang, 29 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983) (real estate salesman); Fintel v. Oregon (In re Fintel), 10 B.R. 50 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1981) (build-
ing contractor); In re Maley, 9 B.R. 832 (Bankr. WD.N.Y. 1981) (liquor license for delicatessen); In re Alessi,
12 B.R. 96 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (horse trainer); Kwasnik v. State Bar, 269 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1990) (bar
applicant); Brookman v. State Bar, 251 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1988) (attorney); Florida Board of Bar Examiners
ex rel. Kwasnik, 508 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1987) (bar applicant); Parker v. Contractors State License Bd., 187
Cal. App. 3d 205,231 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1986) (electrical contractor); In re Batali, 657 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1983)
(attorney).
14Patterson v. B.P. Goodrich Employees Fed. Credit Union (In re Patterson), 125 B.R. 40 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1990) (banking services); Sudler v. Chester Hous. Auth. (In re Sudler), 71 B.R. 780 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987) (lease); Diamond & Gold Connection, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. (In re Diamond &
Gold Connection, Inc.), 54 B.R. 917 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (theft insurance); Bollin Oil Co. v. Reliance
Ins. Co. (In re Bollin Oil Co.), 51 B.R. 936 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (automobile and comprehensive insur-
ance); Heaven Sent, Ltd., v. Centennial Ins. Co. (In re Heaven Sent, Ltd.), 50 B.R. 636 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985) (cargo insurance); Bogey's Barn, Ltd. v. Indiana Ins. Co. (In re Bogey's Barn, Ltd.), 47 B.R. 555 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1985) (fire insurance); Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re Sportfame of
Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.R. 47 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 1984) (sporting goods - court relies on § 105(a)); Olson v.
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bankruptcy-based discrimination is not yet clearly defined. Furthermore, not
every decision interpreting this provision appears to be faithful to the Perez
principle and consistent with Justice White's desire to preserve "the full effec-
tiveness of federal law "'i1
This article examines the most interesting and important questions posed
during more than a decade of litigation challenging bankruptcybased discrimi-
nation. The fundamental issue, one as yet unresolved, is whether activity not
explicitly condemned by Congress is illegal. A consensus on this question is
lacking because courts cannot agree on a methodology for interpreting § 525,
and also because there has been little consideration of possible sources of anti-
discrimination law other than this section. Part I of this article examines these
matters. I then continue with a discussion of whether the rules against dis-
crimination can be applied to contract formation and performance, how dis-
crimination is proved, and the effect of anti-discrimination rules on governmental
regulatory activity. The article concludes with a discussion of remedial matters,
including the appropriate form of relief and the successful plaintiff's possible
right to recover damages and attorney's fees.
I. SOURCES OF LAW 16
There are two types of bankruptcy-based discrimination. 7 Section 525 is
the primary source of the rule that discrimination triggered by an aversion to
the bankruptcy process (improper motive discrimination) is illegal. Perez v. Camp-
bell stands for the proposition that discrimination which adversely affects debt-
ors (adverse impact discrimination) is illegal without regard to motive. Perez
McFarland Clinic (In re Olson), 38 B.R. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (medical services-dictum); In re Amber
Lingerie, Inc., 30 B.R. 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("multi-peril" insurance); In re Son-Shine Grading, Inc.,
27 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) (construction contract); In re Douglas, 18 B.R. 813 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1982) (comprehensive insurance); Marine Elec. Ry. Prod. Div., Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth. (In
re Marine Elec. Ry. Prod. Div., Inc.), 17 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("no motion detectors"); Markim,
Inc. v. JLG Indus., Inc. (In re Markim, Inc.), 12 B.R. 583 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (repair and replacement
parts); In re Coachlight Dinner Theatre of Nanuet, Inc., 8 B.R. 657 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (radio advertis-
ing); Holland America Ins. Co. v. Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia Downs, Inc.), 5 B.R. 529 (Bankr. S.D.
Ill. 1980) (fire insurance-reliance on § 105); Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Drexel-Heritage Furnishings,
Inc. (In re Blackwelder Furniture Co.), 7 B.R. 328 (Bankr. N.D.N.C. 1980) (purchase of furniture - reliance
on § 105).
"sPerez, 402 U.S. at 652.
16In the first part of this article I argue that § 525 is not the sole source of prohibitions against bankruptcy
based discrimination, an argument first advanced in Douglass G. Boshkoff, Private Parties and Bankruptcy
Based Discrimination, 62 IND. LJ. 159, 166-75 (1987). At that time I was mainly interested in the negative
inferences drawn (improperly, in my view) from the positive prescriptions found in § 525. The emphasis
here is on the special status of§ 525 as a codification of existing case law, a matter referred to only briefly
in the first article. Id. at 171, 181-82.
17See Part MII infra for a discussion of both types of discrimination.
(Vol. 66
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also provides a supplementary rule of law which may be applicable to instances
of improper motive discrimination not explicitly condemned by the statute. The
relationship between these two sources of law becomes clearer as the case law
applying § 525 is reviewed. It is also possible that state law may supplement
the protection provided by federal statutory and decisional law. 8
A. FEDERAL LAW
Many reported decisions deal with challenges to forms of discrimination
not clearly prohibited by § 525. More than a decade of litigation has not yet
resulted in an agreement concerning the process of statutory interpretation
to be followed in such cases. Some judges adopt a completely textual approach,
and assign meaning to parts of the statute without any consideration of legis-
lative materials or historical context. A contrasting line of opinions features
analysis not so closely tied to statutory language. 9 No one disputes, for example,
the fact that bankruptcy-based discrimination is clearly prohibited with respect
to existing traditional employment relationships. But consensus collapses when
potential employees and independent contractors also invoke the protection
offered by § 525.
Before considering the scope of this legislation and contrasting two com-
peting lines of authority, it is helpful to have the structure of § 52520 clearly
in mind. It contains two subdivisions. Subdivision (a) comprises the original
'
5See text infra at notes 41-49, 162 for a discussion of state law.
'
9 One writer has characterized courts with these competing views of the statute as "liberal courts" and
"'exact' courts' Elizabeth A. Bronheim, Note, Interpreting Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 7 BA ,l, .
DEv. J. 595 (1990). The Eleventh Circuit has recently adopted an expansive view of the protection provided
by § 525. B.F. Goodrich Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 967 F.2d 505 (11th
Cir. 1992) holds that membership in a credit union is protected by the employment discrimination prohibi-
tion of § 525(b).20Section 525 Protection against discriminatory treatment.
(a) Except as provided in the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930
(7 U.S.C. 499a-499s), the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (7 U.S.C. 181-229),
and § 1 of the Act entitled "An Act making appropriations for the Department of
Agriculture for the fiscal year endingJune 30, 1944, and for other purposes:' approved
July 12, 1943 (57 Stat. 422; 7 U.S.C. 204), a governmental unit may not deny, revoke,
suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant
to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny
employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employ,
ment against, a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or
a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt
or debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been
a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been
insolvent before the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case
but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that
is dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under the
Bankruptcy Act.
(b) No private employer may terminate the employment of, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, an individual who is or has been a debtor under
1992)
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statutory enactment. Subdivision (b) was added in 1984. While the language
of these two subsections is not identical in all respects, each
(1) prohibits the type of discrimination referred to in the
subsection
(2) if the discriminatory act is taken "solely"
(3) because of one of three triggering events.
These three events can be
(1) use of the bankruptcy process,
(2) the debtor's insolvency,21 or
(3) failure to pay a dischargeable obligation.
The legislative history informs us that § 525 "codifies the result of Perez
v. Campbell.' 22 It is always important to remember that this codification was
an affirmative act, an acknowledgement that Perez was a sound decision. There
is nothing in the legislative development of this anti-discrimination rule which
suggests the slightest dissatisfaction with the result in that case.23 Nor is there
anything in the legislative record which suggests that codification should inhibit
future development of debtor protection doctrine or fix the outer limits of re-
strictions on bankruptcy-based discrimination. Indeed, the House and Senate
documents accompanying the original legislation support the view that § 525
was seen as only a partial response to the problem of bankruptcy-based dis-
crimination.
The section is not exhaustive. The enumeration of vari-
ous forms of discrimination against former bankrupts is not
intended to permit other forms of discrimination. The courts
have been developing the Perez rule. This section permits fur-
this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an individual
associated with such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankupt-
(1) is or has been a debtor under this title or a debtor or bankrupt under
the Bankruptcy Act;
(2) has been insolvent before the commencement of a case under this
title or during the case but before the grant or denial of a discharge; or
(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title
or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
21The prohibition against referring to the debtor's insolvency lasts only until there has been a grant
or denial of discharge. This event occurs quickly in a chapter 7 case, at the end of a case under chapter
12 or 13, and upon confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. What if the actor seeks to justify an adverse action
with a prediction made prior to discharge that the debtor will be insolvent after discharge? No case has
yet considered the legality of such pessimism. Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc. v. Oklahoma Horse
Racing Comm'n (In re Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc.), 111 B.R. 948 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990), holds
that it is permissible to base a regulatory action upon a prediction that a chapter 11 debtor will not be able
to secure confirmation of its proposed reorganization plan.
22S. RaP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867; H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 366 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6322.
23Boshkoff, supra note 16, at 165-66, 171 (1987).
(Vol. 66
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ther development to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-
governmental organizations that perform licensing functions,
such as a State bar association or a medical society, or by other
organizations that can seriously affect the debtors' livelihood
or fresh-start, such as exclusion from a union on the basis of
a discharge of a debt to the union's credit union.24
The claim that § 525 is only a source of law relating to discrimination, not
the sole authority, becomes even more convincing when we consider what was
happening in the courts between 1971 and 1979 as Congress considered the
need for a new bankruptcy statute.
After Perez and before § 525 became effective, two courts had the oppor-
tunity to consider the legality of employment discrimination. In each instance
applicable employer regulations authorized a termination of employment if the
employee filed a bankruptcy petition. 25 Neither court had any difficulty in find-
ing a parallel between the adverse effect of the legislation under attack in Perez
and the adverse effect of the challenged employment practice. Both courts
extended the ijationale of Perez (which protected a debtor's right to own and
operate a motor vehicle) to protection of a debtor's employment. This was a
fairly modest step, since the discriminating employer in both these cases and
in Perez was a public entity.
There was no opportunity,26 prior to the effective date of the Bankruptcy
Code, to consider matters unresolved by these early decisions: the extension
of the Perez ruling (1) to discriminatory termination of employment by private
employers, (2) to situations in which there was a refusal to hire, (3) to victims
of discrimination who were independent contractors rather than employees,
or (4) to other forms of discrimination by various entities. Section 525 was
adopted before courts had had an adequate opportunity to explore the impli-
cations of Perez. Some courts have accepted the invitation 27 to continue develop-
ing the law relating to bankruptcy-based discrimination. Others have not.
Accordingly, no single vision of statutory scope has prevailed. Two examples
show how widely divided the courts remain.
Madison Madison International of Illinois, a chapter 11 debtor,28 was in
the business of providing architectural, designing, and planning services to the
construction industry. It had performed some services for the defendants, a
24S. REP. No. 989 supra note 22, at 81; H.R. REP. No. 595 supra note 22, at 367.
2SRutledge v. Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975) (police officer dismissed for commencing
voluntary bankruptcy); In rc Loftin, 327 So. 2d 543 (La. Ct. App. 1976).(fireman dismissed for commenc-
ing voluntary bankruptcy).
2One other decision, Grimes v. Hoschler, 525 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975),
was a routine application of Perez to adverse state regulatory activity. It followed Perez but did not extend
the ruling to a new situation.
27See text supra at note 19.
"Madison Madison Int'l v. Matra, SA (In re Madison Madison Intl), 77 B.R 678 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987).
1992)
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general contractor and his subcontractor, while they were preparing a proposal
for an automated people mover system at Chicago's O'Hare International Air-
port. The defendants were successful in obtaining the contract to install the
people mover and entered into negotiations for the debtor's services. Debtor
then filed a chapter 11 petition and shortly thereafter the negotiations regard-
ing the engineering work ceased. The court granted defendant's motion to dis-
miss a complaint alleging a violation of § 525(b) for several reasons, including
the fact that there was no traditional employment relationship.
It is therefore implicit that there be an existing employer-
employee relationship between the parties. Here, neither defen-
dant was a private employer of the plaintiff, and, by the same
token, the plaintiff was not an employee of either defendant.
§ 525(b) is limited to discrimination in employment. It is not
as broad as the ban on governmental discrimination contained
in § 525(a). The fact that there is a possibility of a contract
between the parties is not sufficient.
The plaintiff argues that this is "a terribly ripe case to con-
tinue the Congressional intent to defer to the courts to con-
tinue to mark the contours of the anti-discrimination provision
in pursuit of a sound bankruptcy policy" and that "the broad
interpretation mandated by the Congressional history and
intent establishes without a doubt that this relationship falls
squarely within the prohibition of 11 U.S.C. § 525(b)." This
court finds that argument to be unpersuasive. An attempt to
liberalize this statute, in the face of its plain meaning is inap-
propriate. Had Congress intended an expansive interpretation
to § 525(b), it could have so stated....
This is not a case where following the clear language of
the statute will lead to an absurd result. Courts must not
engage in judicial legislation. They are not empowered to tinker
with Congress' statutory schemes, even if they believe they
can improve upon them.29
A sharply contrasting approach can be found in a 1987 decision from
Georgia by Bankruptcy Judge Lamar Davis. 30 The chapter 11 debtor, a logger,
had been intermittently employed by the defendant during the three years
preceding bankruptcy. One month after the chapter 11 plan was filed the debtor
was told that there would be no more work. Responding to the claim that this
action violated § 525(b), the defendant argued that the employment relation
291d. at 680-81 (citations omitted).
30McNeely v. Hutchinson Fin. Corp. (In re McNeely), 82 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987).
(Vol. 66
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ship referred to in that section did not include an independent contractor
arrangement. This argument was unsuccessful:
The distinction between an employee and an independent con-
tractor is essential in allocating potential tort liability under
state tort law, but for purposes of federal bankruptcy law the
distinction is largely irrelevant.
With the enactment of Section 525(b), Congress
attempted to remove a perceived impediment to the fresh start
given debtors availing themselves of bankruptcy law's pro-
tections....
With this national policy in place, it would be peculiar
indeed if Congress intended that the word "employment" as
used in Section 525(b) parallel the meaning of that legal term
of art under state law. Shrewd employers, fearing possible
liability, can easily structure their hiring practices to minimize
the number of people in their hire who are "employees". Since
the success of any debtor's fresh start depends in great meas-
ure upon his or her continued employment, it is difficult to
believe that Congress gave the anti-discrimination protections
only to those who are found to be part of an "employer-
employee" relationship after an examination of the doctrine of
respondent [sic] superior as used by the several states.31
Madison and McNeely are paradigms of two entirely different approaches 32
to statutory interpretation. An inquiry into statutory scope which is restricted
to an examination of the text of § 525 will produce a narrower view of what
is prohibited than an interpretative approach which also considers legislative
intent and purpose. Whatever the merits of these sharply differing methodol
ogies in other contexts,33 a strictly textual approach is unacceptable because
311d. at 632.
32A few courts have taken special note of the two possible ways to approach § 525. Most of these courts
have opted for a narrow interpretation. See, e.g., Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin., 876 F.2d 1090 (3d Cir.
1989) (narrow); In re Exquisito Serv., 823 .2d 151 (5th Cir. 1987) (narrow, but court still finds discrimina-
tion); Wilson v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 777 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1985) (narrow); Goldrich v. New York
State Higher Educ. Serv. (In re Goldrich), 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985) (narrow); Patterson v. B.F. Goodrich
Employees Fed. Credit Union (In re Patterson), 125 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987) (broad); Madison Madison
Intl v. Matra, S.A., (In re Madison Madison Intl), 77 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (narrow); Rees
v. Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Rees), 61 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) (narrow).
33More than fifty years ago Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous court, concluded that the term
"seaman, in a statute abolishing the fellow servant rule, included stevedores engaged in maritime work. he
policy of the statute is directed to the safety of the men.... If they should be protected in the one case,
they should be protected in the other:' International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926).
A most helpful discussion of various theories of statutory interpretation appears in Eskridge and Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STA. L. Rev. 321 (1990).
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it converts the affirmative act of codification into a negative act, a barrier stand
ing in the way of further elaboration of the Perez decision.34
We can illustrate this point by considering how the judge would have
proceeded in Madison if codification had not occurred. Absent the statute,
the judge would have been obliged to decide whether the reasoning of Perez
and the subsequent two cases condemning the discharge of public employees 35
supported the view that bankruptcy-based discrimination by a private party
outside the context of a traditional employment relationship was also illegal. We
have no assurance that the judge would have found for the debtor, but we do
know that the judge would have been required to address the merits in light of
existing authority. While not suggesting that all forms of bankruptcy-based dis-
crimination are unlawful, 36 I do believe that congressional identification of some
forms of illegal discrimination also obligates courts to examine the legitimacy of
other acts which, although not mentioned in the statute, interfere with the
rehabilitative features of bankruptcy law. 7 Put more strongly, the codification
of Perez does not relieve judges of the obligation to think about the practice that
34Several times during the last decade, the Supreme Court has indicated an unwillingness to infer a radical
change in the law from entirely new or different statutory language. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jer-
sey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); Dewsnup v.
Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). In each instance the Supreme Court held that adoption of the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 did not affect case authority developed under the prior statute. The reasoning in these cases
supports the view advanced in the text that the codification of Perez should not prevent extension of its
debtor protection rule to other situations, exactly what was occurring when the codification took place.
However, Justice Blackmun's opinion in United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989),
distinguished two of these decisions.
Kelly and Midlantic make clear that, in an appropriate case, a court must determine
whether Congress has expressed an intent to change the interpretation ofajudicially
created concept in enacting the Code. But Midilantic and Kelly suggest that there
are limits to what may constitute an appropriate case. Both decisions concern statu-
tory language which, at least to some degree, was open to interpretation. Each involved
a situation where bankruptcy law, under the proposed interpretation, was in clear
conflict with state or federal laws of great importance. In the present case, in con-
trast, the language in question is clearer than the language in Midlantic and
Kelly .... In addition, this natural interpretation of the statutory language does not
conflict with any significant state or federal interest nor with any other aspect of
the Code.... There is no reason to suspect that Congress did not mean what the
language of the statute says.
Id. at 245. For a thorough, and critical, discussion of recent Supreme Court bankruptcy decisions which
emphasize interpretive techniques, see Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds,
and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYR. L. Rav. 823 (1991).
3SSee the cases cited supra note 25.
36Discrimination in credit transactions is clearly permissible. See text infra at notes 52-65. See also Watts
v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co., 876 F.2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1989) (temporary and minimal discrimination does
not violate fresh start policy); In re Henry, 129 B.R. 75 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (discrimination with mini-
mal cost consequences is not illegal).
317Kwasnik v. State Bar, 50 Cal. 3d 1061, 269 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1990), recognizes that § 525 and Perez
are independent sources of antidiscrimination law. Id. at 754.
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Perez condemned and the implications of what Justice White had to say.38
McNeely and similar decisions, therefore, illustrate a more sensible interpretive
approach 39 than those decisions whose attention is centered solely on statutory
language. 40
Given the strongly pro-debtor outcome in Perez, the extension of this deci-
sion to other situations between 1971 and 1979, and the legislative endorse-
ment of Justice Whites opinion, it is somewhat surprising that the prohibitions
against bankruptcy-based discrimination have evolved so slowly and haltingly
since 1979. Probably some of the recent reluctance to outlaw activity not fall-
ing clearly within the statutory language simply reflects less sympathy in the
judiciary to all aspects of debtor protection. Judges alone, however, are not
responsible for the current situation. Debtors' counsel have often not appreciated
and pressed the point that there is more than one possible source for the rules
against bankruptcy-based discrimination. The statute provides guidance within
the area that it covers, but it does not deal with all possible types of discrimi-
nation. Perez remains as authority for debtor protection in the unprovided-
for situations not covered by § 525. If this argument is advanced convincingly,
judges might use Perez to supplement § 525 or might be persuaded to adopt
a broader view of what is prohibited by the statute. The end result under either
approach would be more comprehensive debtor protection.
38Section 525(b) was added to the statute in 1984. There is no legislative history accompanying this
amendment, but the statute was apparently designed to overrule cases which had refused to apply the Perez
doctrine to discriminatory discharges by private employers following enactment of the original version of
§ 525. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1979); Barbee v. First Virginia Bank
Colonial (In re Barbee), 14 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).
39Read literally, § 525(b) only prohibits a termination of employment which occurs during or after a
bankruptcy case. The defendant in Tinker v. Sturgeon State Bank (In re Tinker), 99 B.R. 957 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1989), argued that § 525(b) was not applicable because the termination had occurred prior to bankruptcy.
AlthoughJudge Koger found for the defendant on other grounds, he rejected this interpretation of the statute:
JThe Court cannot believe that it was the intent of Congress to set up a foot race
between a prospective bankrupt and his or her employer. To follow the Bank's argu-
ment would be to say that if the employer can get the firing done one moment before
the petition is filed, there never could be a § 525(b) complaint."
Id. at 960. See also Marine Elec. Ry. Prod. Div., Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth. (In re Marine Elec.
Ry. Prod. Div., Inc.), 17 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (rejection of bid illegal although not mentioned
in statute); Coleman American Moving Serv., Inc. v. J.L. Tullos (In re Coleman American Moving Serv.,
Inc.), 8 B.R. 379 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (rejection of bid).
4°Wilson v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 777 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1985) is the best example of a completely
textual approach to the statutory language. In Wilson the Seventh Circuit refused to sanction a bankruptcy,
based firing which occurred before the effective date of§ 525(b). See also In re Douglas, 18 B.R. 813 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1982) (action by private party); Markim, Inc. v. JLG Indus., Inc. (In re Markim, Inc.), 12 B.R.
583 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (action by private party).
In re Exquisito Serv., Inc., 823 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1987), is a very interesting decision in which the Fifth
Circuit noted the existence of two lines of authority, endorsed a narrow reading of the legislative history,
and then became the first and only circuit to hold that § 525 prohibits a bankruptcy-based refusal to renew
a contract. JudgeJolly, in dissent, criticized "the judicial activism of my brothers in the majority.' Id. at 155.
It is surprising that the pro-debtor result in Exquisito has attracted so little attention.
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It is also interesting to consider whether a state might provide protection
against bankruptcy-based discrimination beyond that authorized by § 525 or
derived from Perez. Section 525, for example, does not authorize recovery in
a mixed-motive case, one in which an illegal aversion to bankruptcy is a con-
tributing, not the sole, cause of discrimination. 41 Assume a termination of
employment. Might state law authorize recovery for wrongful discharge in a
mixed-motive situation? If it did, the issue of federal preemption would have
to be addressed.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have both accepted and rejected argu-
ments that state law can supplement the protections provided by federal legis-
lation.42 At present, preemption will occur when there is a preemption clause
in the applicable federal statute, when there is a pervasive scheme of federal
regulation (field preemption) or when there is a direct conflict between the
obligations imposed by the two legal regimes (conflict preemption).43 Since there
is no preemption clause in the Bankruptcy Code, and since a more rigorous
state wrongful discharge rule would not impose conflicting obligations on the
actions or otherwise interfere with the federal regulation, 44 field preemption
remains the only serious possibility. Given the history of bankruptcy legisla-
tion in the United States, it is hard to make an argument for field preemption.
States have traditionally been more reluctant than Congress to adopt rules
facilitating debtor rehabilitation. Indeed, this is the principal reason why there
is a discharge provision in the federal bankruptcy statute.45 The demonstrated
congressional desire to facilitate rehabilitation does not warrant invalidation
of a state's cooperative effort to improve upon the rehabilitative effect of fed-
eral law. It thus seems likely that a state could adopt a different definition of
bankruptcy-based discrimination or, in the case of activity prohibited by federal
4
'The plaintiff in Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1990), argued
that his discharge from employment violated § 525 and was also a wrongful discrimination that was against
public policy under California law. The court found that there had been no violation of § 525. The court
saw no need to discuss the viability of the state law claim, since the latter was predicated on a violation
of federal law.
42Compare Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990) (ERISA preempts state claim for
wrongful discharge related to pension plan) with English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) (Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 does not preempt state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress occa-
sioned by wrongful discharge).
43Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S.Ct. 2374 (1992). See, generally, L. "ImIE,
A MEIcAN CONSTITUTIONAl LAW § 6-26 (2d ed. 1988).
44See, e.g., Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1987); Idell v. Goodman, 273 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct.
App. 1990); Smith v. Terry's Tactor, Inc., 209 Cal. App. 3d 951, 257 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1989); but see Meyers
v. Cohen, 688 P.2d 1145 (Haw. 1984).
45Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. Rav. 69, 108-10 (1982). The need for uniform legislation throughout the United
States and the desire to provide an equitable system of distribution have also been factors supporting the
federal statute in its current form.
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law, provide additional remedies such as punitive damages or an award of attor-
ney fees.46
The suggestion of a supplementary protective role for state law is not with-
out support in existing federal case law. Both the Third47 and Sixth Circuits, 48
for example, have held that § 366 of the Bankruptcy Code does not displace
state and local utility regulations which provide additional protection against
service cutoffs for bankrupt debtors. And in one recent unanimous decision 49
the Supreme Court decided that an employee disciplined for reporting a federal
safety violation could assert a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, notwithstanding her failure to qualify for protection under a federal
statutory "whistle-blower" provision.
II. CONTRACT FORMATION AND PERFORMANCE
There is support for the view that § 525 or Perez imposes a duty of fair
dealing on entities that are, or could be, in a contractual relationship with the
debtor.50 Buyers and sellers of goods and services are not always free to with
hold their custom. Some limitation of the right to choose one's business part-
ners is necessary or non-debtors will be able to prevent effective use of the
Bankruptcy Code's rehabilitation provisions.-5
In seeking to understand how the prohibition of discrimination applies to
contract formation and performance, it is helpful to distinguish three situations:
lending transactions, executory contracts other than lending commitments, and
situations in which there is no pre-bankruptcy contractual relationship with
the debtor.
Adequate access to credit is an essential component of many rehabilita
tion efforts. Credit extensions, therefore, would seem to be a highly appropriate
46See, e.g., Gonzales v. AM Community Credit Union, 442 NW. 2d 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
47Begley v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 760 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1985).
48Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 918 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1990).
49English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
O"In re Exquisito Serv., Inc., 823 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1987) (Air Force ordered to exercise its option to
renew food service contract); Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods, Co. (In re Sportfame of
Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.R. 47 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (seller ordered to continue supplying goods to debtor-§
525(a) cited but court relies mainly upon § 105(a)); In re Amber Lingerie, Inc., 30 B.R. 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) (insurer enjoined from cancelling insurance policy); In re Son-Shine Grading, Inc., 27 B.R. 693 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1983) (North Carolina not entitled to remove debtor from list of qualified bidders); Marine Elec.
Ry. Prod. Div., Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth. (In re Marine Elec. Ry. Prod. Div., Inc.), 17 B.R. 845
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (New York State not entitled to reject debtor's low bid); Coleman American Mov-
ing Serv., Inc. v. Tullos (In re Coleman American Moving Serv., Inc.), 8 B.R. 379 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980)
(Air Force not entitled to reject debtor's low bid); Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Drexel-Heritage Furnish-
ings, Inc. (In re Blackwelder Furniture Co.), 6 B.R. 1337 (Bankr. N.D.N.C. 1980) (furniture manufacturer
ordered to continue supplying goods to debtor-court relies upon § 105(a)).
"'For a sharply differing view concerning the treatment of refusal to deal situations, see Daniel Keating,
Offensive Uses of the Automatic Stay, 45 VND. L. REv. 71, 80-100 (1992).
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subject for regulation. However, despite some indications that § 525 applies
to credit transactions,5 2 courts have without exception refused to sanction lend'
ers for withholding credit. Sometimes the reasoning in these opinions is plau-
sible.53 In other instances it is wholly unconvincing,54 even inconsistent with
Justice White's opinion in Perez." Despite much questionable reasoning, all
the cases reach the right result. Language elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code and
an important part of its legislative history support the conclusion that even the
most egregious discrimination in lending transactions should be beyond judicial
scrutiny. First of all, § 36556 denies the trustee the power to assume or assign
"a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommo-
dations, to or for the benefit of the debtor." Section 525 should be interpreted
in a manner consistent with other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.57 Since
the trustee cannot assume a prebankruptcy commitment to extend credit,58
28aunders v. Reeher (In re Saunders), 105 B.R. 781, 788 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (applicability of§ 525
assumed); In re Richardson, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Rose v. Connecticut Hous. Fin. Auth. (In re Rose),
23 B.R. 662 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982). The status of credit extensions is a significant problem only for courts
which are willing to examine legislative purpose or intent in addition to considering statutory text. Courts
following the narrower textual approach can simply note that credit extensions are not mentioned in the
text. Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co., 876 F.2d 1090, 1093 (3d Cir. 1989); Elter v. Great Lakes Higher
Educ. Corp. (In re Elter), 95 B.R. 618, 622 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989).
53Helms v. Custis (In re Helms), 46 B.R. 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985) (no evidence of completed credit
application); Rose v. Connecticut Hous. Fin. Auth. (In re Rose), 23 B.R. 662 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) (other
facts adequate to justify rejection of credit application).
54Lee v. Yeutter, 106 B.R. 588 (D. Minn. 1989), upheld the validity of FmHA regulations excluding
discharged debtors from participation in a program for restructuring farm loans even if participation would
be helpful to the debtor. With regard to the discrimination claim, the court observed: "[P]laintiffs are not
excluded 'solely' because they have been debtors in bankruptcy. Plaintiffs are excluded because they are
no longer 'borrowers' as required by the Act, a requirement that applies to all who seek restructuring" Id.
at 592. In affirming, the Eighth Circuit did not discuss § 525. See 917 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1990).
"5Goldrich v. New York State Higher Educ. Auth. (In re Goldrich), 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985), sug-
gests that legislative purpose is relevant to a Perez inquiry: "Section 661(6)(b) of New York's Education Law
is not intended to coerce payment of defaulted student loans. Instead the state law is merely designed to
protect the state coffers against repeated defaults, a permissible purpose." Id. at 31. This language resur-
rects the reasoning of Kessler and Reitz, which was explicitly rejected by Justice White in Perez. See text
supra at note 6. See also text infra at notes 94-97.
5611 U.S.C.A. § 365(c)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
'
7Section 525 should not be used to nullify protections provided by other sections of the statute to per-
sons dealing with the debtor. Sudler v. Chester Hous. Auth. (In re Sudler), 71 B.R. 780 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987), incorrectly holds that § 525 overrides the requirement found in § 365(b)(1) that an assuming debtor
cure prepetition defaults. See also Hiser v. Blue Cross (In re St. Mary Hosp.), 89 B.R. 503 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988), and Housing Auth. v. Szymecki (In re Syzmecki), 87 B.R. 14 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988). The better
view is represented by Spruce Ltd. Partnership v. Lutz (In re Lutz), 82 B.R. 699 (Bankr. N.D. Pa. 1988),
which decides that § 525 does not apply to executory contracts. Kipp v. Depoy (In re Depoy), 29 B.R. 466
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983), avoids the need to reconcile § 365 and § 525 by holding that the latter section
does not apply to discriminatory activity by private landlords.
'SGill v. Easeby Enter., Inc. (In re Easeby Enter., Inc.), 900 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (option to pur-
chase property with extended payment terms); Whinnery v. Bank of Onalaska (In re Taggatz), 106 B.R.
983 (Bankr. WD. Wis. 1989) (promise to fund portion of promissory note); Continental Exports Enter.,
Inc. v. Stowers (In re Continental Exports Enter., Inc.), 26 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (mortgage com-
mitment); In re Town Mall, 17 B.R. 326 (Bankr. S.D. 1982) (mortgage commitment).
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§ 525 is not violated by a refusal to provide the promised financing or by a refusal
to loan money to a debtor when there is no prebankruptcy commitment.
Confirmation of the special status of credit extenders is found in the fact
that they were instrumental in obtaining an important concession during the
debate which preceded adoption of the current statute. The Bankruptcy Com
missiods proposal would have outlawed lender consideration of prior bankrupt-
cies.59 The credit industry was able to convince Congress that this was a poor
policy decision,60 and the current language of § 525(a) represents a substan-
tial retreat from the initial position of the Bankruptcy Commission. Standing
together, the language contained in § 365 and the narrowing of the Bankruptcy
Commission's initial proposal warrant the conclusion that credit extenders are
beyond the reach of the rules which otherwise prohibit bankruptcy-based dis-
crimination. Credit extension decisions are sui generis. The cases would be far
easier to understand if all courts openly acknowledged the special status of
credit extenders. 61
Even though a refusal to honor a lending commitment is not improper as
long as § 365(c)(2) prevents the trustee from substituting the bankruptcy estate
as promisee, the case law interpreting the latter section suggests that this special
group of transactions will not be very large. It will include traditional mort-
gage commitments 62 and other contract arrangements in which the prospec-
tive financial strength of promisee or third party plays a particularly important
role in the promisor's decision to make its commitment. 63
39The Bankruptcy Commission reported:
A person shall not be subjected to discriminatory treatment because he, or any per-
son with whom he is or has been associated, is or has been a debtor or has failed
to pay a debt discharged in a case under the Act. This action does not preclude con-
sideration, where relevant, of factors other than those specified in the preceding sen-
tence, such as present and prospective financial condition or managerial ability.
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. I, at 143-44 (1973).6
°Boshkoff, supra note 16, at 165-66.
61Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co., 876 F.2d 1090, 1095 (3d Cir. 1989), notes the special status
of credit extensions in holding that the termination of energy assistance payments did not violate the auto-
matic stay. It is not clear why the court did not use the same reasoning to dispose of the discrimination claim.
62GiII v. Easeby Enter., Inc. (In re Easeby), 900 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990); Continental Exports Enter.
Inc. v. Stowers (In re Continental Exports Enter., Inc.) 26 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Town
Mall, 17 B.R. 326 (Bankr. S.D. 1982). But c In re TS Indus., Inc., 117 B.R. 682 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990)
(assumption of financial accommodation agreement possible where agreement executed at time when
bankruptcy could be anticipated).
63Thnsamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Citibank (In re Sun Runner Marine), 945 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir.
1991) (flooring agreement) (alternative holding). But 4 In re Cole Bros., 137 B.R. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1992). See also In re Wegner Farms Co., 49 B.R. 440 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (grain dealer's surety bond);
In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc., 12 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (GNMA guarantee). There are
also several decisions involving letters of credit. Two decisions incorrectly hold that the "financial accom-
modation" rule prevents the trustee of a bankrupt beneficiary from drawing on the letter of credit. See In
re Swift Aire Lines, Inc., 30 B.R. 490 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), and Tarantino v. Strutz Kentucky Park, Ltd.,
No. 4-86-266 and 695, 1989 WL 83540 (D. Minn. July 25, 1989). The financial strength of the beneficiary
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The mention of credit in a transaction or regulation does not, standing alone,
warrant the conclusion that any bankruptcy-based discrimination must be
ignored. The form of the transaction is not controlling. For instance, some
government assistance programs are cast in the form of loans even though they
are, in reality, outright grants. Debtor eligibility for participation in such pro-
grams should still be subject to the normal anti-discrimination rules.64 Further
more, governmental constraints on lending activity are not always beyond the
reach of anti-discrimination rules, notwithstanding the fact that individual lend
ers are free to use the existence of bankruptcy as a justification for refusing
credit. For example, Elsinore Shore Associates v. New Jersey Division of Alcohol
Control65 invokes Perez and § 525 to invalidate a New Jersey regulation which
denied liquor wholesalers the option of extending credit to retailers in finan-
cial difficulty. This case was correctly decided even though, as already noted,
no one can be forced to extend new credit to a debtor. Any individual vendor
would clearly be within its right in requiring cash on delivery. New Jersey, how-
ever, violated § 525 when it sought to compel all wholesalers to join in a with-
drawal of credit.
Every contractual arrangement in which performance and payment are not
concurrent conditions exposes one party to the risk of not receiving the antic-
ipated exchange. 66 Credit extenders can protect themselves simply by refusing
to deal with the debtor. Other contracting parties, lacking the discretion to
discriminate, 67 must be content with the safeguards found in § 365, such as
is irrelevant. The issuer relies on the financial strength of the party who obtains the letter of credit and
will be affected by that party's bankruptcy. PNC Intl Bank v. Allied Stores Int'l (In re Allied Stores Int'l),
1990 Bankr. LEXI 212 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990), correctly invokes the financial accommodation rule to prevent
the debtor from placing further orders for clothing with the beneficiary of a letter of credit when the letter
was issued to insure payment for such orders.
64Kotter v. United States Dep't of Agric. (In re Kotter), 58 B.R. 118 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986), and In re
Haffner, 25 B.R. 882 (Bankr. N.D. In. 1982), involve debtor participation in nominal loans which were part
of governmental farm programs. Both cases were decided correctly. Kotter decides that the government was
within its rights in denying debtor the opportunity to participate in the program since its decision was based
on a substantial grain shortage in a prior year. In Haffner there was no non-bankruptcy justification for the
denial of program eligibility and § 525(a) was violated.
6566 B.R. 708 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986). In re Jacobsmeyer, 13 B.R. 298 (Bankr. WD. Mo. 1981), invali-
dates a state regulation which prohibited any sales, cash or credit, to a retailer who had failed to make pay-
ment for previous liquor purchasers. The court ordered resumption of deliveries to the debtor on a c.o.d. basis.
66"All contracts hold varying degrees of financial risk ... but the degree of exposure of the parties does
not determine whether [the contract is a financial accommodation arrangement]. Instead, one must con-
centrate on the central purpose of the contract." Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Thomas B. Hamilton
Co. (In re Thomas B. Hamilton Co.), 115 B.R. 384-85 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990) (citations omitted).
67Section 365(c)(2) does not protect a lessor obligated by the terms of the lease to bear the cost of remodel-
ing the leased premises prior to occupancy by the lessee. In re United Press Intl, Inc., 55 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1985) ("The instant lease contract is not a financial accommodation precisely because it is not like
a loan commitment or letter of credit. To interpret financial accommodations' to include the lease contract
at issue here would be to allow the exception to swallow the rule. Under such a broad interpretation, any
contract could be viewed as providing some financial benefit, and therefore no contract would be assuma-
ble") See also In re Farrell, 79 B.R. 300 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (lease of personal property). But see Dean
v. Postle Enter., Inc. (In re Postle Enter., Inc.), 48 B.R. 721 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985):
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"adequate assurance of future performance", and any further protection which
can be obtained through careful planning and drafting.68 For example, a credit
supplier of goods or services can bargain with the other party for a payment
bond or a letter of credit.69 A contract may condition the promisor's obliga-
tion on the existence of facts which increase the likelihood that the return per-
formance will be forthcoming as long as the language chosen does not contravene
the statutory prohibition of clauses which are bankruptcysensitive or which
refer to the debtor's "insolvency or financial condition " 70
Those not having a current relationship with the debtor, either because
a contract has expired or because one never existed, have been compelled to
deal with the debtor as sellers or buyers.71 Courts granting injunctive relief
sometimes suggest ways in which the interests of these nondebtors can be pro-
tected. Sellers of goods are not obligated to offer credit. They are entitled to
insist upon immediate payment. 72 Past dealings between the parties can also
The parties contemplated that the landlord would be required to borrow the neces-
sary funds to finance construction from a lender or lenders. Debtor-tenant thus benefits
by not having to finance the structural improvements itself, but instead have [sic]
movant incur the lender's fees, charges and interests. Some of the remodeling may
be required because oflessee's desire to convert the premises from a presently exist-
ing motion picture theatre to some type of combined bar or dinner theatre opera
tion. Such conversion may or may not meet with success. If unsuccessful, there is
no showing movant could attract another tenant without again remodeling the struc-
ture from a dinner theatre configuration. The end result of the funding clause is to
require a major financial investment from the lessor for improvements which most
immediately benefit the debtor. Clearly, the original $150,000 contemplated suffi-
cient financial strength of the tenant to allow the venture to succeed. Enactment
of§§ 365(c)(2) and (e)(2)(B) evidences Congressional recognition that a subsequent
bankruptcy casts a distinct pall over the success probability of a tenant. To that end,
the non-debtor is not required to perform contracts involving financial accommoda-
tions, loans or debt financing. This is such a case.
Id. at 725.
68In re West Electronics, Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988), found that a solvent contractor and an in
solvent chapter 11 debtor were different entities for the purposes of the prohibition against assignment of
government contracts found in 41 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West 1987).
69Several cases assume without any discussion that a bond or letter of credit may be required with
out violating any bankruptcy policy. See PNC Int'l Bank v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc. (In re Allied Stores
Intl, Inc.), 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 212 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (letter of credit); In re Charrington Worldwide
Enter., Inc., 110 B.R. 973 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (bond); In re Larkspur, Inc., 82 B.R. 37 (Bankr.
E.D. La. 1987) (bond); Fintel v. Oregon (In re Fintel), 10 B.R. 50 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1981) (bond)
(dictum).
70The most obvious form of protection is a contract specification concerning the debtor's financial health.
In light of the questionable validity of such protective clauses (see 4 CoTusa, BA xs.. Pa4c. GumE 68.06[8]
(1989); 2 CoL.im oz BANmKUwPC 365.04[21 (15th ed. 1992)), it is wiser to rely on the protection provided
by a bond or letter of credit.
71 5ee the authorities cited supra note 39 (last paragraph).
72Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re Sporffame of Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.1L 47 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1984); Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Drexel-Heritage Furnishings, Inc. (In re Blackwelder Funi
ture Co.), 6 B.& 1337 (Bankr. N.D.N.C. 1980).
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help define the substance of any court ordered relationship. 3 Appropriate pro-
tection for those ordered to purchase goods or services from the debtor is more
difficult to achieve. Purchasers will need to rely on the debtor's future finan-
cial stability. Fulfillment of obligations under a construction contract, for exam-
ple, will occur over a period of time. Warranty obligations of a seller of goods
extend into the future. At a minimum, those f6rced to deal with the debtor
should receive the same "adequate assurance of future performance" as would
be provided to one already bound to a prebankruptcy contract.74
The availability of other protective devices has been suggested. The court
in In re Son-Shine Grading, Inc. ,75 for example, offered advice to governmental
authorities forced to accept bids from chapter 11 debtors.
The State of North Carolina has argued extensively that
if the relief requested by the Debtor is granted that it will be
forced to contract with irresponsible debtors. Such is not the
case. The Debtor has not complained about the financial
requirements for bidding on highway projects other than the
provision which prevents it from bidding solely because of its
filing a bankruptcy petition. Furthermore, the Debtor is not
requesting this Court to tell the State of North Carolina what
financial reqtiirements may or may not be required of its bid-
ders. However, if a contractor can meet all bidding require-
ments of other contractors except for the fact that it has a
barikruptcy petition pending, then it becomes very apparent
that the State of North Carolina is arbitrarily assuming that
a bankruptcy debtor cannot meet its reasonable requirements
for bidding on state highway projects. In many cases, a debtor
under Chapter 11 may be much better able to perform its con-
tracts than a contractor not in bankruptcy since the current
operating profits of the debtor-contractor are not required for
an immediate use in the payment of pre-petition debts. 76
73The court in Sportfame stated:
There remains the question of the terms and duration of the order. The debtor
shall be required to pay cash either in advance of or upon receipt of goods. Upon
receipt of Debtor's order, Wilson should ship goods without undue delay and shall
not unreasonably discriminate against Debtor's orders. As far as possible, the par-
ties shall operate on a normal business relationship consistent with their previous
course of dealing over the past ten years.
Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re Sportfaine of Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.R. 47, 53 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1984).
7411 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1992).




At first glance, this suggestion appears to conflict with § 365's prohibi-
tion of a reference to "the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor.'77
Language of the type suggested by the Son-Shine court, inserted in a prebank-
ruptcy contract, would clearly be unenforceable.78 However, it is plausible79
to assert that one soliciting bids is entitled to refer to the bidder's financial con-
dition. Since this situation is governed by § 525, which only prohibits one not
under contract to the debtor from discriminating because of bankruptcy or insol-
vency, a reference to a financial condition other than solvency is permissible
and the suggestion of the Son-Shine court was appropriate.
III. PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
There are two types of bankruptcybased discrimination. Most plaintiffs
allege an improper motive and establish that an aversion to bankruptcy trig,
gered activity which adversely affects the debtor. For example, the debtor is
fired, not hired, or demoted because of her bankruptcy. Less commonly, adverse
impact discrimination exists, without proof of intent, when debtors as a class
are adversely affected by an activity-usually a governmental regulation.80 Perez
is the prime example of this second type of discrimination.8'
A. IMpRoPEa MoTrvE DIsCRIUMNATION
The debtor who alleges improper motive discrimination must establish (1)
an improperly motivated act which (2) adversely affects a protected interest such
as an employment relationship.82 The motivation is improper if the act is trig-
-11 U.S.C.A. § 365(b)(2)(A), (e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
"The possible enforcement of a financial covenant after the bankruptcy case is closed is discussed in
4 Cowm, BANKRx. PRAc. GuDE 68.06[8] (1989). Collier suggests a strategy of threatening to invoke the
covenant after bankruptcy. This will not be a practical course of action for many entities forced to accept
the debtor's low bid. The party dealing with the debtor may already have suffered a loss by the time the
covenant becomes enforceable.
79This view is plausible and, I believe, correct. However, as to the reach of § 525 (see text supra
Part I) I do not believe that the analysis should focus on statutory language alone. It is important to
ask whether the distinction between the two sections makes sense. I think it does. Those who have
already entered into a contractual relationship with the debtor have had the opportunity to evaluate its
future financial prospects. Those who did not have this opportunity, particularly public entities who must
consider all potential bids, should be allowed to use different, and reasonable, techniques to assess future
financial stability.
58Of. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
BIThe improper motive and adverse impact categories are suggested by a distinction drawn in the law
of employment discrimination between disparate treatment discrimination and disparate impact discrimi-
nation. See CmHAis A. SuLnv x, er al., E'mroymmr DiSCaImNATiON § 2.2 (2d ed. 1988). I have chosen
to use slightly different terms to emphasize the fact that the prohibition against bankruptcybased discrimi
nation is not identical to what is found in Title VII. For example, the bona fide occupational defense allowed
by Title VII (Id. at § 3.6) is not recognized in § 525, except with regard to dealers in livestock and perisha-
ble agricultural commodities. It is, however, a generally applicable defense in Title VII litigation. Id. at § 3.6.
82See text supra at notes 19-39.
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gered by the debtor's actual or anticipated 3 involvement in a bankruptcy case
by the failure to pay a dischargeable obligation4 or, in limited circumstances,
by the debtor's insolvency.85 Quite often the court will be presented with
diametrically opposed explanations for the act. The debtor will claim that the
motivation was improper, particularly when the questionable activity occurs
in close proximity to a bankruptcy or when theie are references in the record
to the fact of bankruptcy. The actor can be expected to counter with an inno-
cent, nonbankruptcy explanation for what has occurred.
Discrimination is established whenever (1) there appears to be a connec-
tion between bankruptcy and the challenged act, and (2) the actor's profession
of innocence is not credible. For example, the court in In re Rath Packing Com-
pany8 6 found that the revocation of a debtor's self-insurance exemption by the
Iowa Insurance Commissioner violated § 525. This self-insurance exemption was
due to expire onjune 30, 1981. An application for renewal filed onJune 24 had
the effect of continuing the exemption in force pending a final determination of
eligibility. The Commissioner was aware of the debtor's financial difficulties.
On September 17, 1982 a hearing was held to determine if the exemption should
be withdrawn but no revocation of exemption occurred until November 2, 1983,
one day after the debtor had filed a chapter 11 petition. As the court noted:
[Aifter the September 1982 hearing, the Commissioner pos-
sessed all the information cited as reasons for revoking the
Debtor's exemption except the filing of the bankruptcy sched-
ules on November 1, 1983. Nonetheless, the Commissioner
failed to act upon a record available to him .... Moreover,
nothing in the record shows that had the Debtor not filed its
petition on November 1, 1983, the Commissioner would have
revoked the exemption.... Viewed in this light, the Commis-
sioner's assertion that its decision to revoke was based on non-
tainted reasons is not credible.87
83Read literally, § 525 only protects the debtor against discrimination on account of bankruptcies past
and present. Tinker v. Sturgeon State Bank (In re Tinker), 99 B.R. 957 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989), decides
that the statutory prohibition should also apply to a firing in anticipation of a bankruptcy.
84This part of the statute does not apply to attempts to collect a non-dischargeable educational loan.
Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984).
851t is only illegal to base an adverse decision on the debtor's financial condition prior to the grant or
denial of the discharge. This language is related, but not identical, to the prohibition of reliance on financial
condition covenants in § 365(b)(2)(A), (e)(1)(A). Such covenants remain unenforceable until the case is
closed. Furthermore, this part of§ 525 only forbids discrimination on account of insolvency. The cited sub-
sections of § 365 refer to both "insolvency" and "financial condition". See text supra at note 70.
8 6ln re Rath Packing Co., 35 B.R. 615 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983). Rath holds that the revocation violated
both § 362 and § 525. The finding of an improper motive was only necessary for the § 525 violation.
871d. at 619. See also In re McNeely, 82 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987) (change in timber quota follow
ing filing of chapter 11 plan); In re Carlton Fruit Co., 86 B.R. 254 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); Coleman American
Moving Serv., Inc. v. Tullos (In re Coleman American Moving Serv., Inc.), 8 B.R. 379 (Bankr. D. Kan
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In re Alessi s8 contrasts well with Rath and is a perfect example of licens-
ing activity which is not discriminatory. Rule 3.08 of the Illinois Racing Board
authorized the refusal, suspension or revocation of a license, to "fa]ny participant
who shall accumulate unpaid obligations, or default in obligations, or issue drafts
or checks that are dishonored or payment refused, or otherwise display finan-
cial irresponsibility reflecting on his experience, character or general fitness:'
The record accompanying a denial of the debtor's application for a racing license
included ample evidence of "[an] accumulation of unpaid obligations by Alessi
in the racing industry, especially the debts to persons for whom Alessi has driven
and with whom he had owned horses.' The theory of the racing board was
that these debts might subject Alessi to undesirable influences and endanger
the integrity of the sport. There was no hint in the record that Alessi's resort
to bankruptcy had displeased the licensing board.8 9
Neither Rath nor Alessi debates the existence of a causal link between the
supposed aversion to bankruptcy and the harmful act. There was no need to
do so. Proof of an antibankruptcy bias was obviously lacking in Alessi and, in
Rath, once an aversion to bankruptcy was established the causal connection
was clear. Sometimes, however, there is credible evidence of more than one
motive for the challenged activity. In these mixed motive cases the statutory
requirement that the discrimination be "solely" triggered by an aversion to
bankruptcy90 should result in dismissal of the debtor's claim. A few courts, con-
cerned that a literal application of the term "solely" will preclude recovery in
most discrimination lawsuits, have adopted a less demanding causation require-
1980). The likelihood that there is a causal connection between bankruptcy and a termination of employ-
ment diminishes with the passage of time. See, e.g. Laraquente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17,
23 n.4 (18 months).
8812 B.R. 96 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981). See also Christmas v. Maryland Racing Comm'n (In re Christmas),
102 B.R. 447 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989), which accepts the defendant's argument that factors other than
bankruptcy were responsible for the suspension of a horse trainer's license.
8See also Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc. v. Oklahoma Horse Racing Comm'n (In re Will Rogers
Jockey & Polo Club, Inc.), 111 B.R. 948 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (racing license denied because "racing
market was 'saturated'") Id. at 953.
In a similar vein is Stockhouse v. Hines Motor Supply, 75 B.R. 83 (D. Wyo. 1987). Tn an action for wrongful
discharge, the court granted defendant's motion for a summary judgment. There was ample evidence that
factors other than the bankruptcy were responsible for the debtor's problem. He frequently failed to give
customers correct parts, there were many customer complaints, he was warned that he would be dismissed
if his performance did not improve, and a decision to replace him had been made before his employer learned
of the bankruptcy case.
9OBoth parts of § 525 require that the action be taken "solely" because of the prohibited factors. The
same language also appears in the other section prohibiting bankruptcybased discrimination section, 11
U.S.C.A. § 366(a) (West Supp. 1992), and in some other federal statutes outlawing discrimination. See,
e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1991) (discrimination against handicapped persons). However, an attempt
to include similar language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was defeated. Senator Case observed
that requiring a single cause for Title VII actions "would place upon persons attempting to prove a viola,
tion of this section ... an obstacle so great as to make the title completely worthless.' Mark S. Brodin, The
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COL. L. Rr.
292, 297 (1982).
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ment that permits recovery when bankruptcy plays a significant role in the
adverse decision.9' As Bankruptcy Judge David Scholl once observed,
[W]e do not think a debtor need prove that the government
explicitly denied a benefit only because of a bankruptcy filing
to prove a case under § 525(a). It would be quite impossible-
or at least unlikely-that a governmental unit could be found
to have acted adversely on the grounds of a debtor's bank-
ruptcy filing rather than at least partially upon consideration
of the financial circumstances of the debtor which lead to
the bankruptcy filing. It is also unlikely that a governmental
body cognizant of § 525(a) will concede that it acted exclu-
sively on the basis of a bankruptcy filing. Therefore, we believe
that adverse government actions concerning which a bank
ruptcy filing appears to play a significant role are proscribed by
§ 525(a).92
Other courts, including the First and Ninth Circuits, have opted for a strict
approach to the language dealing with causation. 93 From the debtor's perspec-
tive, the situation is not as bleak as predicted by Judge Scholl. Most cases in
which motive is an issue fit easily into the categories exemplified by Rath and
Alessi. True mixed motive cases are hard to find. While a number of opinions
discuss causation in mixed motive situations, most of the time the credible evi-
dence clearly shows only one motive for the challenged act.94 This leaves only
four to six decisions in which the term "solely" affected the outcome of the
litigation. 95
91Bell v. Sanford-Corbitt-Broker, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,114 (D.S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 1987) ("but
for" analysis); In re Metro Transp. Co., 64 B.R. 968 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) ("significant role"); In re The
Bible Speaks, 69 B.R. 368 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (dictum).
921n re Metro Transp. Co., 64 B.R. 968, 975 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
93Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1990) (alternative holding);
Laracuente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17 (Ist Cir. 1989); In re Massenzio, 121 B.R. 688 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y 1991); United States v. Professional Sales Corp. (In re Professional Sales Corp.), 56 B.R. 753 (N.D.
IMl. 1985).
94Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1990) (no discrimination) (alter,
native holding); In re Bill, 90 B.R. 651 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1988) (discrimination); Housing Auth. v. Szymecki
(In re Szymecki), 87 B.R. 14 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (discrimination) (holding criticized in note 52 supra);
Anderson v. Weinberger (In re Anderson), 84 B.R. 426 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (no discrimination); Hicks
v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Hicks), 65 B.R. 980 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986) (discrimination); Smith v. Pennsyl-
vania Dep't of Transp., 66 B.R. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (discrimination); United States v. Professional Sales
Corp. (In re Professional Sales Corp.), 56 B.R. 753 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (no discrimination); Helms v.
Custis, 46 B.R. 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985) (no discrimination); Good Time Charlie's Ltd. v. Black (In re
Good Time Charlies Ltd.), 25 B.R. 226 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (discrimination prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 366).
9 Mangan v. Cullen, 870 F.2d 1396 (8th Cir. 1989); Christmas v. Maryland Racing Comm'n (In re
Christmas), 102 B.R. 447 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989); Tinker v. Sturgeon State Bank (In re Tinker), 99 B.R.
957 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); Nasson College v. New England Ass'n of Schools & Colleges, Inc. (In re
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B. ADVERSE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION
Not all challenged activity can be linked directly with an aversion to
bankruptcy and its discharge. Consider again the facts of Perez. Arizona law
required a public official to revoke driving privileges for failure to pay an obliga-
tion created by the operation of a motor vehicle9 6 The judgment creditor was
empowered to consent to restoration if appropriate payment arrangements were
negotiated.97 Nonetheless, the defendant argued that no hostility to the objec-
tives of bankruptcy law was to be inferred from the legislative activity. While one
can argue that the Arizona legislation was a poorly disguised and deliberate
attempt to subvert bankruptcy policy, Justice White instead chose to ignore in-
tent and examine the effect of the state statute.98 This is a sound approach since
it leads to a nationwide uniform application of federal law under the Supremacy
Clause. Perez remains the paradigm of redress for adverse impact discrimination.99
The expression of a bias against bankruptcy in adverse impact cases can
be subtle, difficult to perceive, and difficult to prove. Courts have been slow
to recognize the proposition that insolvent debtors, including those who are
involved in bankruptcy cases, should not be subject to a greater regulatory bur-
den than persons who are not experiencing financial problems. The failure to
recognize this form of bankruptcybased discrimination is particularly appar,
ent in two Sixth Circuit opinions.
The first case, Duffey v. Dollison,00 decided in 1984, involved an unsuc-
cessful challenge to the Ohio Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act. Ohio
drivers were required to provide proof of financial responsibility if they did not
satisfy accident related judgments within thirty days of entry of judgment.
Absent satisfaction of the victim's claim in the initial thirtyday period, proof of
financial responsibility was mandatory even if payment was later forthcoming.
The Sixth Circuit, in rejecting a challenge to this type of financial responsibility
arrangement, placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the Duffeys had
Nasson College), 80 B.R. 600 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988). See also Laracuente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891
F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1989), and In re The Bible Speaks, 69 B.R. 368 (Bankr. D. Ma. 1987).
These last two cases are difficult to classify. Laracuente looks like a mixed motive case. However, this
may be because, while the debtor was challenging the trial court's grant of the employer's motion for sum,
maryjudgment, she failed to provide the trial court with a required statement of contested issues of material
facts. This meant that the trial court (and the appellate court) was obliged to accept the employer's view
of the case. The court twice refers to "uncontroverted facts" in the last two paragraphs of the opinion.
The reported facts in Bible Speaks are strongly suggestive of a mixed motive case. The defendant failed,
however, to advance the non-bankruptcy justification (failure to submit required financial information) for
withdrawal of a school's accreditation.
96Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1162(A) (repealed 1989).
97Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1162(B) (repealed 1989).
9 4 02 U.S. at 652. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the approach toward pre-emption taken
in Perez. See Gude v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992).
9See also In re Taylor, 27 B.R. 83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Hayfield v. Director of Pub. Safety (In re Layfield),
12 B.R. 846 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981); Henry v. Heyison, 4 B.R. 437 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
1-734 P.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
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failed to do anything during the initial thirty-day period.
The Ohio Financial Responsibility Act in no way discrimi-
nates against bankrupts, or penalizes them for filing in bank-
ruptcy. The Act provides that "any person" who fails to satisfy
an accident-related judgment within 30 days shall have his or
her driving privileges suspended by the Registrar. The stat-
ute applies without exception to any person who fails to satisfy
a judgment for whatever reason, whether because of unwill-
ingness, inadvertence, or inability to pay. Once the judgment
has been certified to the Registrar for non-payment, the debt-
or's obligation to furnish proof of finanical responsibility
becomes fixed. Thereafter, neither payment of the debt, reaffir-
mation, nor bankruptcy can relieve the debtor of this require-
ment. Judgment debtors such as the Duffeys who seek relief
under the bankruptcy laws are therefore treated no differently
from any other judgment debtor. Indeed, it is this lack of dis-
crimination to which the Duffeys take exception. By arguing
that bankrupts who have proved to be irresponsible drivers
should be excused from their requirement of posting proof of
financial responsibility, the Duffeys in effect ask this Court "to
go beyond the fresh-start policy of Perez and.., give a debtor
a head start over persons who are able to satisfy their unpaid
judgment debts without resort to a discharge in bankruptcy."
We do not believe that section 525 was intended by Congress
to afford debtors in bankruptcy such preferential treatment °0
This quotation contains a mischaracterization of Ohio law. It also evidences
a lack of sympathy with the Perez principle. If the statute truly required proof
of financial responsibility from "bankrupts who have proved to be irresponsi
ble drivers," there would be no conflict with bankruptcy policy. Non-dis-
criminatory financial responsibility laws are fully enforceable as long as proof
of financial responsibility is not linked with nonpayment of debt. A state may
legitimately require all drivers to obtain insurance before operating a motor vehi-
cle. Alternatively, it may require insurance of all drivers who have been involved
in an accident as long as nonpayment of accident-related claims plays no part
in triggering the obligation to obtain insurance. Statutes of either variety
properly protect the public interest 02 by applying evenhandedly to all opera-
101Id, at 273 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
102n re Colon, 102 B.R. 421, 428 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (CIf state law mandates the suspension or revo-
cation of driving privileges due to the nature of the infraction or the driver's history of traffic violations,
irrespective of whether the driver promptly pays a fine, the bankruptcy code will not interfere with the
exercise of this police power. That is, the automatic stay does not preclude the state from removing unsafe
drivers from the roads.") See also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 600 A.2d 237 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal
denied, 606 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1992).
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tors without regard to whether or not they can satisfy accident-related claims.
However, the Ohio statute does not fit into either category. It only requires
proof of financial responsibility from drivers who are perceived to be irrespon
sible (nonpaying) debtors.
Consider the way in which the statute operates before and after the obli-
gation to provide proof of financial responsibility has become irrevocably fixed.
During the initial thirty-day period, the constitutional infirmity is obvious. The
Ohio procedure has the effect of coercing the debtor to pay a dischargeable
obligation in order to retain his driving privileges. The value of the discharge
is clearly undercut. Perez is directly on point.V 03 The Sixth Circuit was correct
in observing that, after thirty days had passed, "the debtor's obligation to fur-
nish proof of financial responsibility becomes fixed. Thereafter, neither pay-
ment of the debt, reaffirmation, nor bankruptcy can relieve the debtor of this
requirement"'10 4 However, there is now a new objection to the statute. The
class of persons subject to regulation will always be made up primarily of peo-
ple who cannot pay obligations dischargeable in bankruptcy. Even though there
is no mention of bankruptcy, the statute's sting will be felt mainly by those
in financial difficulty who have sought the protection of the bankruptcy court. 05
And Perez clearly prohibits a state from singling out bankrupt debtors for adverse
treatment.
Norton v. Tennessee Department of Public Safety'0 6 is equally unsympathetic
to a claim that parts of Tennessee's Financial Responsibility Act violate the
prohibitions against bankruptcy-based discrimination. Tennessee law required
the owner or operator of a motor vehicle to provide retrospective proof of finan-
cial responsibility for any accident involving more than $200 damage to the
person or property of another.0 7 Failure to provide such proof could result in
a license revocation. The statute provided fifteen exceptions to the license revo-
cation rule, including proof of discharge of the accident claims through a
bankruptcy case. Payment of a $65 "restoration fee' was required of persons
claiming the benefit of this provision. A similar charge was not assessed against
anyone asserting the benefit of any of the other fourteen exceptions to the revo-
cation rule.
103lfDuffey's bankruptcy case had been commenced during the initial 30,day period, the Sixth Circuit
would have been obliged to apply Perez and invalidate the statute.
10734 F.2d at 273.
103The class will also contain persons who are either very forgetful or very stubborn. It is unlikely that
many drivers will be so recalcitrant or forgetful. It may be difficult, however, to prove that debtors as a group
are adversely affected. See MAcK A. PrAYER, EMLoYmNr D=snmNATiON, §§ 5.46(b), 5.46(c) n.260 (1988).
In Duffey, it would have been necessary to identify all drivers required to post proof of financial responsibil-
ity and then analyze their status.
106867 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
O7Trhis provision did not violate the Perez principle because it applied to all persons involved in an acci-
dent without regard to ability to pay.
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Both the bankruptcy judge and the district court struck down imposition
of this $65 fee but the Sixth Circuit disagreed:
The Tennessee legislature recognized the plight of those in
bankruptcy and provided an expedited means in which a bank
rupt could avoid revocation even before the debt is actually
discharged in bankruptcy. PFRA did not deprive Norton of
a "fresh-start;" rather, we agree with the position of appellant
that it actually afforded him a "head start" 08
This reasoning is unpersuasive. The debtors would still have been entitled
to prevent revocation by claiming the benefit of a bankruptcy discharge even
if there were no explicit reference to this situation in the Tennessee statute.
The Tennessee legislature simply codified the federal right in a state statute
and then assessed a discriminatory $65 fee on one who asserts the benefit of
a federal right. As applied, the statutory fee impermissibly applied to a class
of persons composed exclusively of debtors who sought protection under the
bankruptcy law. It would, however, have been appropriate for Tennessee to
assess a restoration fee in each of the fifteen listed situations, including receipt
of a discharge in bankruptcyY 9
Antidiscrimination rules do not eliminate every obstacle to success. Some
governmental regulations, such as zoning ordinances, may make it difficult or
impossible to achieve success. Nevertheless, the zoning ordinance is valid as
long as none of the prohibited factors listed in § 525 is used to determine
whether a building permit is needed, and the class of persons required to obtain
building permits does not contain a disproportionately high percentage of bank-
rupt debtors." 0 Evenhandedness, an impartiality that is real,"' is all that the
law should require." 2
108867 F.2d at 317.
109Cf. In re Tel-Net Hawaii, Inc., 131 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991) (new service fee in a variety of
circumstances; no discrimination under § 366). For a different analysis of Duffey and Norton, approving of
the results in those cases, see Keating, supra note 51, at 105-08.
"
0See In re Historic Lower Mill Ass'n, Inc., 49 B.R. 66 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). For a similar analysis of the
exclusion provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), see In re Wengert Transp., Inc., 59 B.R. 226, 230 (N.D. Iowa
1986). See also Will Rogers Jockey & Polo Club, Inc. v. Oklahoma Horse Racing Comm'n (In re Will Rogers
Jockey & Polo Club, Inc.), 111 B.R. 948 (Bankr. N.D. Oka. 1990).
"'Some courts have, incorrectly I believe, been too willing to accept the neutral language of the stat-
ute (no mention of bankruptcy) and have failed to inquire into how the statute actually operates. See, e.g.
Goldrich v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv., 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Henry, 129 B.R. 75 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1991).
12Section 525 is not violated when a debtor's prebankruptcy employment experience is used to deter-
mine the debtor's postpetition liability for unemployment insurance taxes. In re Primrose Bedspread Corp.,
67 B.R. 659 (Bankr. NJ. 1986); Ravenna Indus., Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 51 B.R.
496 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). The Sixth Circuit, without mentioning § 525, recently approved the reason-




Why is adverse impact discrimination challenged so infrequently in reported
litigation? Given the myriad forms of governmental regulatory activity, one
would expect to encounter it much more often. Surely, many regulatory authori
ties have learned the lesson of Perez. I suspect, however, that a lack of lawyer
familiarity with the opinion also contributes to the current situation." 3 The
codification of anti-discrimination rules in § 525 has drawn attention away from
the adverse impact analysis offered by Justice White. Now, we tend to be more
sensitive to deliberate attempts to subvert the bankruptcy process. Nonethe-
less, there continue to be two quite different categories of actionable conduct 14
IV. REMEDIES
The two questions most often arising in discrimination litigation are: (1)
is the challenged act illegal; and (2) in instances of improper motive discrimi-
nation, has the causation requirement been satisfied? There are also occasional
discussions of remedial questions, such as whether the successful plaintiff is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees. While a consideration of the proper
remedy occurs in only a relatively small number of cases, remedial issues are
significant and merit some attention.
1. The Proper Forum
Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear discrimination claims pursuant to
the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute," 5 because a discrimination claim is a civil
proceeding arising under Title 11.1 6 The federal question provision in Title 28" 7
provides a second source of jurisdiction. The discrimination claim is a civil action
arising under the laws of the United States." 8 Neither grant of jurisdiction is
exclusive and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over discrimination liti-
gation." 9
Most debtors choose a federal forum. Discriminatory acts usually occur
'13 routinely ask lawyers interested in this area of the law whether they have read Perez. Less than
5% are familiar with Justice Whites opinion.
114These categories are not mutually exclusive. An action could be rooted in an aversion to bankruptcy
and also have an adverse impact on debtors as a group. Hanratty v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (In re Hanratty),
907 F.2d 1418 (3d Cir. 1990), may be such a case. Hanratty upholds a utility's practice of requiring deposits
from bankrupt debtors while not requiring the same deposit from new residential customers unless they
already owe money to the utility. Clearly this practice adversely affects debtors as a group and also appears
to be motivated by the filing of bankruptcy cases. Relying on § 366, the court correctly holds that the deposit
requirement is valid. Section 366 authorizes discrimination by utilities who are forced to extend credit to
their customers.
11328 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West Supp. 1992).
116H.R. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6401.
11728 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1992).
118Cf. Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977).
" rhe issue of whether a bankrupt debtor is qualified to practice law has traditionally been resolved
through state court litigation.
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during the pendency of the bankruptcy case and the request for relief is directed
to the bankruptcy judge. An action alleging a violation of either § 525 or the
Perez principle is a core proceeding. 2 Even though many discrimination actions
will not fall within one of the fifteen statutory categories appearing in § 157(b)5'2 1
the list provided in this section is not exclusive0 22
Federal courts continue to have jurisdiction over discrimination claims even
though the bankruptcy case has been closed or dismissed.23 A request for relief
during the post-bankruptcy period should be addressed to the district court
judge. 24
2. Equitable Relief
A successful plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief. Section 105125 author-
izes the court to issue any order "necessary or appropriate to carry out the pro-
visions of this title.' The defendant may be enjoined from continuing an illegal
course of action or from engaging in future discriminatory acts. The existence
of a court order is a prerequisite for a contempt citation126 since, unlike § 524
which prohibits post-discharge collection activity, 27 § 525 contains no statu-
tory injunction.
An injunction against continuation of the illegal action will often provide
adequate relief for the debtor.'28 When employment discrimination is alleged,
reinstatement, the remedy of choice in other wrongful discharge situations,129 is
also appropriate for illegal action induced by bankruptcy. It is possible, of course,
that reinstatement may not be an effective remedy 30 Nonetheless, it should be
12°Inre Sweeney, 113 B.R. 359 (Bankr. W.D. Ohio 1990). Cf. 5CoLtTER BArn. Pa~c. GUImE 78.06(1992).
12'When the actor is also a creditor, the discrimination litigation can be brought within the phrase in
§ 157(b)(2)(O) "other proceedings affecting... the adjustment of the debtor-creditor... relationship." Dis-
crimination litigation against noncreditors, however, does not come within categories A-0.
122The opening line of § 157(b)(2) provides "Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-.... "
123Cf. Price v. Rockford, 947 F.2d 829, 832 n.1 (7th Cir. 1991) (postbankruptcy damage award for vio-
lation of the automatic stay).
124Id.
12S1 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 1979).
126Geiger v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp. (In re Geiger), 137 B.R. 586 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re
Hopkins, 66 B.R. 828 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986).
12711 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992)
128See In re Vaughter, 109 B.R. 329 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (injunction against future discrimination);
In re Latchaw, 24 B.R. 457 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (injunction against implementation of discriminatory
employment practice). See also In re Nejberger, 120 B.R. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (injunction against considera-
tion of improper factor in licensing decision preferred to order directing renewal of license, since it results
in less intrusion into state licensing process).
129Barbara Ann Brown, Labor Law: Wrongful Discharge, 1987 ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 779, 806.
'"Reinstatement may not be an effective remedy unless the employee is represented by a union. See
Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. Rsv. 1, 40-44.
The union can protect the employee from retaliation by the employer. Professor West suggests large com-
pensatory and punitive damages as practical substitutes for reinstatement. Id. at 46. In re Hopkins, 81 B.R.
491 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987) recognizes the possibility of animosity between the litigants but rejects it as
a basis for denying reinstatement.
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ordered if the debtor so requests.' 3'
Refusal to deal situations create unusual remedial possibilities. The court
can protect the debtor by enjoining cancellation or ordering renewal of a con-
tractual relationship. At the same time, it must be careful not to force an exten-
sion of credit upon an unwilling nondebtor. In one very interesting opinion which
relies upon § 362(a)(6) rather than § 525 to prevent a shut-off of supplies to
a chapter 11 debtor, the court indicated an awareness of the special status of
credit extenders:
There remains the question of the terms and duration of
the order. The debtor shall be required to pay cash either in
advance of or upon receipt of goods. Upon receipt of Debt-
ors order, Wilson should ship goods without undue delay and
shall not unreasonably discriminate against Debtor's orders.
As far as possible, the parties shall operate on a normal busi-
ness relationship consistent with their previous course of deal-
ing over the past 10 years. Although Debtor has requested
an order of unlimited duration, the spirit of this order, to
remedy the violation of stay and promote the rehabilitation
effort, can only justify its continuance through the course of
this reorganization proceeding. 32
A plaintiff wishing injunctive protection must be alert to the possibility
that any delay in seeking relief can be prejudicial to its claim. In one instance
a chapter 11 debtor was the low bidder on a government contract. The award
went to the next highest bidder, and it was conceded that this occurred solely
because the debtor was involved in the bankruptcy case. The plaintiff waited
three months before challenging the rejection of its bid. By that time the suc-
cessful bidder had begun work on the project. The request for an injunction
was denied. The court indicated that equitable relief would have been granted
upon a timely application. 33
3. Damages
Most often the relief granted in discrimination litigation is equitable in
131In re Hopkins, 81 B.R. 491 (Bankr. WD. Ark. 1987), goes further and orders a part-time employee
reinstated to a full-time position when it was clear that the employee was prevented from advancing to a
full-time position. See also Hicks v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Hicks), 65 B.R. 980 (Bankr. WD. Ark. 1986)
(employee restored to former position when reassignment violated § 525). But cf. In re Sweeney, 113 B.R.
359 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990), in which the court refused to order reinstatement of a probationary employee
who, following the discriminatory discharge, did not maintain the knowledge and skills required for the
position. The court failed to explain why reinstatement would be "inequitable and inadvisable." Since the
employer wrongfully discharged the employee, it should have assumed the burden of retraining him.
"32Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.R. 47,
53 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
133Marine Elec. Ry. Prod. Div., Inc. v. New York City Transit Auth. (In re Marine Elec. Ry. Prod. Div.,
Inc.), 17 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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nature. There are also a few cases in which damages are awarded in addition
to, or as a substitute for, equitable relief. Thus, the wrongfully discharged
employee is entitled to a back pay award 134 and an independent contractor can
recover lost profits for a wrongful refusal to deal' 35 In one case the former
employee also recovered damages for emotional distress caused by the dis-
criminatory act. 36
Every decision but one assumes that federal law establishes the proper meas-
ure of damages. In re Marine Electric Railway Products Division137 is the sole
exception. In Marine the court denied a chapter 11 debtor's request for dam-
ages arising from the wrongful rejection of its bid on a government project. The
court relied on a New York rule denying such a recovery to disappointed bid-
ders, and ignored the fact that the plaintiff asserted that the rejection was
wrongful under § 525(a) rather than relying on state law. This was error. The
plaintiff's entitlement to damages should have been measured by federal
standards. 38
Very few plaintiffs receive either punitive damages 139 or an award of attor-
ney's fees. 40 In part, this is probably due to lack of initiative by counsel. There
appear to be few requests for these types of monetary relief. Furthermore, the
presence of language in other code sections' 4' authorizing the award of puni
tive damages and attorney fees complicates the situation. One court noted the
absence of an explicit authorization in § 525 and concluded: "If Congress had
desired to sanction or encourage fee awards in cases under § 525, it could easily
have granted the courts discretion to make such awards. It did not do so."142
This is one of many instances in which the old and discredited 43 maxim
"espressio unius est exclusio alterius" has been used by a court to avoid the
'
34Sweeney v. Ameritrust Co. (In re Sweeney), 113 B.R. 359 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Hopkins,
81 B.R. 491 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987); Bell v. Sanford-Corbitt.Broker, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,114
(S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 1987).
l3SMcNeely v. Hutchinson Fin. Corp. (In re McNeely), 82 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987).
136Bell v. Sanford-Corbitt-Broker, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,114 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 1987).
13717 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
138The possibility that state law may provide an additional remedy is discussed supra at notes 41-49
and infra at note 162.
"39In re Vaughter, 109 B.R. 329 (Bankr. WD. Tex. 1989), appears to be the only instance in which the
plaintiff requested (and received) an award of nominal (punitive) damages.
4'on re Patterson, 125 B.R. 40 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990) (granted); Sweeney v. Ameritrust Co. (In re
Sweeney), 113 B.R. 359 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (denied); In re Vaughter, 109 B.R. 329 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989) (granted); Bell v. Sanford-Corbitt-Broker, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,114 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 14,
1987) (denied); Hicks v. First Natl Bank (In re Hicks), 65 B.R. 980 (Bankr. WD. Ark. 1986) (denied); In
re Island Club Marina, Ltd., 41 B.R. 359 (Bankr. N.D. IMI. 1984).
.4.11 U.S.C.A. §§ 303(i), 362(h) (West Supp. 1992); § 523(d) (West Supp. 1992).
'
42Hicks v. First Natl Bank (In re Hicks), 65 B.R. 980, 984 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986).
143The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" has been repeatedly criticized by academic writers.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm.
L. REv. 800, 813 (1983); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in
the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 892, passim (1982). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. Rav. 405, 455-56 (1989).
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necessity of dealing with a difficult problem of statutory interpretation. The
same line of reasoning can be found in some decisions involving § 525.4 The
problem of statutory interpretation with regard to attorney fee awards, how-
ever, is somewhat different than the one discussed earlier with reference to
the definition of impermissible discrimination. 4-5 The Perez principle is availa-
ble for the redress of discrimination in situations not covered by § 525. How-
ever, American law generally does not sanction the award of attorney fees absent
statutory authorization. 46 The failure to mention attorney fees in § 525 is sig-
nificant, not because of any negative inference, but because there is no sup-
plementary general principle, like the one announced in Perez, to deal with
circumstances not falling within the statutory language. The plaintiff who
wishes attorney fees for discrimination litigation must advance a justification
apart from the Bankruptcy Code. Some possibilities are 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b)
(Equal Access to Justice Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976), and state law. 47
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) 148 permits an award of attorney fees to some plain-
tiffs who prevail in a controversy with the United States. There are divergent
views as to whether the bankruptcy judge is authorized to make the fee award.
Recently, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that the award of attorney fees need
not be made by an Article II adjudicator. a9 The court was persuaded that
its conclusion was "consistent with the underlying purpose of the EAJA to
encourage individuals and small businesses to challenge adverse government
action notwithstanding the high cost of civil litigation."so The Eleventh Cir-
cuit disagrees'' Except in the Tenth Circuit, a request for attorney fees is likely,
therefore, to lead to some procedural maneuvering. While the claim under §
525 is a core proceeding, 52 the fee award will be noncore. If the government
consents, the bankruptcy judge can enter a final order adjudicating the fee
claim.5 3 Otherwise, the EAJA issue must be treated as a noncore related
'44$ee text supra at note 40.
145See text supra part H.
'])AN B. DOBBS, Rmams 194 (1973).147Gonzales v. AM Community Credit Union, 442 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. Ct. of App. 1989). See text supra
at notes 41-49 for a general discussion of the relationship between state debtor protection laws and the
Bankruptcy Code.
14828 U.S.C.A. § 2412(b) (West Supp. 1992). The court must find "that the position of the United States
was not substantially justified." Id. at 121.
149O'Connor v. United States Dep't of Energy, 942 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1991).
150942 F.2d at 774.
"'Gowerv. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Davis), 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1990). Accord, IRS v. Brick-
ellInv. Corp. (InreBrickellnv. Corp.), 922 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1991) (fee award pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7430).
'
5 2See text supra at notes 120-22.
1-28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(2) (West Supp. 1992). Consent may be inferred from a failure to object to a
bankruptcy court's exercise of core jurisdiction. Canal Corp. v. Finnman (In reJohnson), 960 F.2d 396 (4th
Cir. 1992).
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matter whether it is raised later in a separate proceeding 54 or is joined with
the initial discrimination claim.
42 U.S.C. § 1988155 provides another statutory base for the award of attor-
ney's fees. Application of this provision is appropriate whenever the plaintiff
establishes a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.56 In Maine v. Thiboutot'5 7 the
Supreme Court decided that a § 1983 cause of action exists when state offi-
cials deprive petitioners of benefits granted by a federal statute. While the Social
Security Act was implicated in Maine, the Court's reasoning applies with equal
force to a violation of § 525 or to an act prohibited by Perez. 58 The Supreme
Court has been reluctant to apply § 1983 to rights derived from statutes since
its decision in Maine.0 59 Nonetheless, most of the lower court authority sup-
ports the view that a violation of § 525 also violates § 1983.60 Unless the
Supreme Court directly repudiates Maine, § 1988 should continue to provide
a basis for awarding attorney fees to the plaintiff who establishes the existence
of bankruptcy-based discrimination by a nonfederal governmental unit.'6'
Finally, the plaintiff who chooses to litigate the discrimination claim in state
court can request an award of attorney fees whenever authorized by state law.6 2
4. Governmental Immunity
The Supreme Court has recently had the occasion to consider when the
defenses of sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity can be
successfully asserted in litigation relating to rights created by the Bankruptcy
14In re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136, 1141 (11th Cir. 1990).
'"542 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) (West Supp. 1992).
-1642 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981).
117448 U.S. 1 (1980).
'sperez decided that there is a right to be free of bankruptcy-based discrimination, an inference drawn
from the debtor protection provisions in the statute and enforced, as to state law, by means of the doctrine
of preemption. A claim based upon the preemptive effect of a federal statute can be enforced in a § 1983
action. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
'59For the most recent refusal to find a § 1983 violation, see Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
The cases refusing to find a § 1983 action (including Suter) place heavy emphasis on the existence of a com-
prehensive remedial mechanism (other than a damage action) to redress a statutory violation. There is no
non-judicial remedy for a violation of § 525.
160Watts v. Philadelphia Hous. Fin. Co. (In re Watts), 93 B.R. 350 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds 876 F.2d 1089 (1989); Gibbs v. Housing Auth., 76 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); Higgins v.
Philadelphia Gas Works, 54 B.R. 928 (E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Richardson, 15 B.R. 925 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 27 B.R. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Moya v. Philadelphia Gas Works (In re Moya), 8 B.R.
202 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Periera v. Chapman, 92 B.R. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1988). Contra, In re Begley,
41 B.R. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
16'Government officials are entitled to a qualified immunity when charged with a violation of § 525
and § 1983. Mangan v. Cullen, 870 F.2d 1396 (8th Cir. 1989); Detz v. Hoover, 539 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
162Cf. Gonzales v. AM Community Credit Union, 442 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (action to
recover damages for improper collection activity related to a discharged debt). I assume that the state law
is not preempted. See text supra at notes 41-49. The plaintiff can also obtain an award of attorney fees
pursuant to § 1983 when advancing the § 1983 claim in state court. See text infra at note 169.
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Code. Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for a waiver of sover-
eign immunity, received a narrow construction in Hoffman v. Connecticut Depart,
ment of Maintenance163 and United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.' 64 In Hoffman
a plurality of the court decided that § 106 did not waive Connecticut's Elev-
enth Amendment immunity in an action seeking a monetary recovery.5 Nor-
dic reaches the same conclusion with regard to the sovereign immunity of federal
government. Neither immunity will affect the relief granted in most discrimi-
nation litigation, since the plaintiff usually seeks an injunction against further
discriminatory activity. The existence of a governmental immunity does not
preclude the award of prospective relief and ancillary attorney fees. 66 While
a waiver of the immunity defense is possible if the congressional intent is clearly
stated, 67 the mention of "governmental unit" in § 525(a) is probably not a suffi-
ciently clear statement to qualify as a waiver. 68
Finally, whenever the plaintiff seeks damages, immunity problems can be
avoided by seeking relief in state court. The Eleventh Amendment only applies
to actions commenced in federal court. 69
5. Enforcement of AntiDiscrimination Rules
a. The Non-Debtor Victim
Both subdivisions of § 525 prohibit discrimination against a debtor "or
another person with whom such ... debtor has been associated" (emphasis
added). Assume that debtor files an individual bankruptcy petition. Employer
discharges debtor's spouse since it fears that employer's customers will react
adversely to spouse's association with someone who is seeking the protection
provided by bankruptcy. The discharge violates § 525. Spouse is the direct vic-
tim of the discrimination and, as such, is entitled to relief from the wrongful act.
b. Standing
An unreported opinion by Judge Joe Lee, Lockworth, Inc. v. Kentucky Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet,70 raises the interesting ques-
163492 U.S. 96 (1989).
164112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992).
16Mrhe Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits in federal court against municipalities or political sub-
divisions of a state. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
'66In re Massenzio, 121 B.R. 688 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990); Collon v. Hart, 114 B.R. 890 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1990) (violation of§ 362(a)).
167Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1989).
"'6The decision in Nordic precludes the argument that a waiver can be derived from the language of
§ 106, and the legislative history suggests the same conclusion with regard to § 525. The latter codifies
the result in Perez, a case involving only prospective relief. There was no consideration of whether § 525
constituted a waiver of federal or state immunity in a damage action.169Cf. Howett v. Rose, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (§ 1983 action in state court). It is reasonably clear that
the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to prevent enforcement of a federally created right in
state court. See L. ThmE, A iaucaN CONSTrruTroNAL LAW 185-89 (2d ed. 1989).
170Case No. 87-00053, Adversary No. 87-0137 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 30, 1987).
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tion of whether discrimination can be challenged by someone other than the
direct victim of the wrongful act. In Lockworth Kentucky law required the posting
of a reclamation bond by persons engaged in mining operations. Bonds writ
ten by surety companies were not acceptable if the surety had commenced a
bankruptcy case. Following the disqualification of its surety, a mining company
was unable to obtain replacement bonds. Judge Lee decided that the disqualifi-
cation, simply because of the fact that the surety company had filed a bankruptcy
case, violated § 525. He further decided that the mining company had stand-
ing to raise the issue of discrimination even though it was not the immediate
victim of the wrongful act. 71 This conclusion seems sound, at least as long as
the interests of the immediate victim and the plaintiff do not diverge. 2 It recog-
nizes that persons other than the victim can be severely injured by bankruptcy-
based discrimination. It is also consistent with the approach taken with refer-
ence to exemptions in § 522(1), a provision which allows a dependent of the
debtor to claim an exemption if the debtor fails to do so.
c. Class Actions
Two decisions, one involving discrimination prohibited by § 366173 and the
other involving § 525,174 recognize the legitimacy of a class action when the
discriminatory activity affects similarly situated debtors.
CONCLUSION
Both Local Loan and Perez articulated rules for protecting the interests of
individual wage earners. After a large volume of litigation in the 1980's, the
prohibition against bankruptcy-based discrimination is now understood to pro-
tect a much wider range of entities, without regard to their sources of income.
In the past two years, however, cases invoking, or even discussing, Perez
and § 525 have become a rarity. It is likely that this sharp decline in litigation
is related to a significant recent shift in public attitudes toward the rehabilita
tion of both consumer and business debtors. Perez and the Bankruptcy Com-
mission's codification proposal occurred during a period of great sympathy to
consumer debtor concerns. Section 525(a) was part of a statute which also
17
'The plaintiff mining company was also involved in a bankruptcy case. Judge Lees opinion dearly
indicates that it is the surety's right to be free from discrimination which is being enforced. Id. at 8.
a
72Cf. Friedman v. Harold, 638 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1981) (trustee has no standing to challenge gender
distinction in state law relating to tenancy by the entirety when effect of successful challenge will be to
defeat discrimination victim's right to exemption ofjointly owned property). See also In re Crouch, 33 B.R.
271 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983), which suggests that a non-debtor spouse's claim of exemptions under § 525(l)
should not "unduly prejudice the debtor".
7In re Whittaker, 84 B.R. 934 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), modified sub nomn. Whittaker v. Philadelphia
Elec. Co.., 92 B.R. 110 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
174Watts v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Co., 76 B.R. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd on other grounds,
876 F.2d 1090 (3d Cir. 1989).
(Vol. 66
BANKRUPTCY-BASED DISCRIMINATION
sought to encourage corporate reorganizations. The high tide of support for
debtor rehabilitation prevailing in 1979 has now receded somewhat. Recent
changes in the law related to individual debtors favor creditor interests, and
some aspects of chapter 11 are under attack. Even though Perez and § 525,
properly understood, regulate the relationship between a debtor and noncred-
itors, the prohibitions against discrimination must surely be affected by changes
in public attitudes toward the debtor/creditor relationship itself. The unwill-
ingness of some courts to look beyond the text of § 525, although sometimes
justified as deference to the will of Congress, can also be seen as a consequence
of the hardening in public attitudes toward debt and bankruptcy. When
individual debtors must work harder to pay off their student loans and chap-
ter 11 is criticized as being too advantageous to corporate equity interests, the
frequency and success of discrimination litigation can also be expected to decline.
Nonetheless, Perez and its progeny are now too firmly integrated into our law
of bankruptcy to be dislodged. Further development and refinement of the prin-
ciples discussed in this article will occur when public sympathy for the plight
of all types of debtors again increases, as history suggests it eventually will.
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